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Abstract 
Good corporate governance is an enabling factor for the growth, development and 
success of corporations in this era of globalization and international competition. The 
corporate scandals of the early 2000s have reinforced the importance of corporate 
governance; they have stimulated research and experimentation with new modes of 
corporate governance. 
Following the reforms introduced in North America in the last decade, lawyers have 
been formally integrated into the corporate governance regulatory framework. Canadian 
and U.S. regulation now clearly assigns a gatekeeping role to corporate lawyers. The 
legal qualification of corporate lawyers as gatekeepers has significant theoretical support 
in the literature. Yet criticism of this position raises doubts, or at least sensitive issues, 
regarding this qualification. We conclude that further empirical studies would be apposite 
to gain a finer grained understanding of the practice and contributions of corporate 
lawyers as gatekeepers and a better appreciation of the appropriateness of such role.  
Keywords: corporate governance; gatekeepers; legal profession 
JEL Classification: K22 
 
Contents 
I. THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A THUMBNAIL SKETCH .......................................... 2 
A. Gatekeepers and Corporate Governance .............................................................................................................. 2 
B. Corporate Lawyers as Gatekeepers ...................................................................................................................... 3 
II. THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL FRAUDS: THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE LAWYERS’ GATEKEEPING 
FUNCTION .......................................................................................................................................................................... 5 
A. An Overview of the Reform Initiatives Regulating Corporate Lawyers’ Gatekeeping Function .............................. 5 
B. In conclusion: A Critical Look at the Regulatory Initiatives .................................................................................... 6 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  	   Professor	  of	  Law	  and	  holder	  of	  the	  CDACI	  Chair,	  Faculté	  de	  droit,	  Université	  de	  Montréal.	  
2	  	   Assistant	  Professor	  of	  Law	  and	  member	  of	  the	  CDACI,	  Faculté	  de	  droit,	  Université	  de	  Montréal.	  
3	  	   Emeritus	  Professor	  of	   Law	  and	  member	  of	   the	  CDACI,	   Faculté	  de	  droit,	  Université	  de	  Montréal;	   fellow,	  Cirano,	  
Montreal.	  
LAWYERS	  AS	  GATEKEEPERS	  
2 
III. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................................... 8 
 
Corporate governance refers to the process and structures used to direct and 
manage the business of corporations. Good corporate governance is an enabling factor 
for the growth, development and success of corporations in this era of globalization and 
international competition.4 Over the past two decades, it has attracted increasing 
attention from governments and regulators interested in securing a legal and institutional 
environment in which corporations can thrive. The corporate scandals of the early 2000s 
have reinforced the importance of corporate governance.  
Much attention has been given to the role of the Board in securing good corporate 
governance. But the Board alone, however well structured, cannot guarantee good 
corporate governance. In this paper, we look at a further component, to wit gatekeepers. 
We ask in particular whether corporate counsel can play this role by acting to stop or to 
whistle-blow where potential or real wrongdoing comes to their attention. In Part I, we 
look at the role of gatekeepers in corporate governance and the suitability of different 
kinds of lawyers to play that role. In Part II, we study corporate governance reform 
regarding gatekeepers in North America following corporate scandals, such as Enron, at 
the beginning of the millennium and then further reform following the financial disarray 
from 2008 on. We end with a critical look at whether these reforms are likely to succeed 
in investing lawyers with the responsibility of corporate gatekeepers. 
I. THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A 
THUMBNAIL SKETCH 
A. Gatekeepers and Corporate Governance 
Our understanding of corporate governance issues has been shaped by law and 
economics scholarship, which has effectively revived the field of corporate law.5 Within 
law and economics, the operative parts to consider are agency theory and the nexus-of-
contracts theory. These theories see three main agency conflicts threatening value 
maximisation by corporations: 1) conflicts between managers and shareholders; 2) 
conflicts between dominant and minority shareholders; 3) conflicts between 
shareholders and stakeholders.6 The role of corporate governance norms is to mitigate 
these conflicts in order to promote value maximisation by the corporation.  
From this perspective, there are two broad types of corporate governance 
instruments: internal and external instruments. The internal instruments refer to the 
board of directors, shareholder voting, and horizontal monitoring by managers. The 
external instruments encompass the market for corporate control, the labour market, the 
products market, and corporate and financial markets regulation.  
Traditionally, in North America, corporate governance has been considered to be 
primarily a private matter best left to the discretion of corporate actors, in accordance 
with the enabling role of corporation law that flows from the nexus-of-contracts theory. 
Private initiative is expected to generate value-maximizing governance norms. They are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  	   R.	   J.	   Daniels	  &	   R.	  Morck,	   “Canadian	   Corporate	   Governance:	   The	   Challenge”,	   in	   R.J.	   Daniels	  &	   R.K.	  Morck,	   eds,	  
Corporate	  Decision-­‐Making	  in	  Canada,	  Calgary,	  University	  of	  Calgary	  Press,	  1996,	  at	  3.	  
5	  	   See	  for	  instance	  R.	  Romano,	  “After	  the	  Revolution	  in	  Corporate	  Law”,	  (2005)	  55	  J.	  of	  Leg.	  Ed.	  342.	  
6	  	   See	   R.H.	   Kraakman,	   J.	   Armour	   et	   al.	   (eds),	   The	   Anatomy	   of	   Corporate	   Law:	   A	   Comparative	   and	   Functional	  
Approach,	  2nd	  ed.,	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  U.P.,	  2009.	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to emerge from the interaction between members of the corporation and are to be 
enforced by the same mechanism.  
The corporate scandals of the early 2000s have called into question this conception 
of corporate governance. Starting with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”), in 2002, 
mandatory rules have been enacted in the U.S. and Canada to address agency 
problems in publicly-traded corporations. The financial crisis that followed from 2008 on 
led to calls for further mandatory rules, which in the U.S. took the form of the Dodd-
Frank Act of 2010.  
The reform initiatives targeted primarily the board of directors, given its central role 
in corporate governance. But they also focused on another group of key actors in 
corporate governance: gatekeepers.  
The concept of gatekeeper is due to Professor Reinier Kraakman. He defines 
gatekeepers as “private parties who are able to disrupt misconduct by withholding their 
cooperation from wrongdoers.”7 Gatekeepers act as “reputational intermediaries who 
provide verification and certification services to investors.”8 By reducing information 
asymmetries, they contribute to lowering the cost of capital for issuers. In addition, 
gatekeepers perform monitoring functions, acting as “chaperones” that can detect and 
disrupt misconduct in an unfolding relationship.  
To qualify as gatekeepers, intermediaries must firstly have the power to prevent 
wrongdoing. Secondly, they must have reputational capital, i.e. they must be repeat 
players so that they have incentives to establish and maintain a trustworthy reputation for 
themselves. Thirdly, the value of their reputation must exceed the benefit they could draw 
from false certification. Classic gatekeepers include auditors, corporate lawyers, investment 
bankers and credit rating agencies.  
 Gatekeepers are an essential component of an effective corporate governance  
regime. As Coffee writes, “[n]o board can outperform its gatekeepers.”9 Without these 
independent intermediaries, “boards will predictably receive a stream of selectively 
edited information from corporate managers that presents the incumbent management in 
the most favorable light possible”.10 However, one reason for the scandals and crisis of 
the first decade of the 21st century stems from the failure of the gatekeepers. Whence 
the reforms introduced in the past ten years in the hope of improving the gatekeeping 
function.  
B. Corporate Lawyers as Gatekeepers 
The idea that corporate lawyers can play the role of gatekeepers has been around 
for some time. Lawyers were identified as gatekeepers in Kraakman’s 1984 seminal 
article.11 However, it is the financial scandals of the early 2000s that gave traction to this 
idea. Starting with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, lawyers have been identified as corporate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  	   R.H.	  Kraakman,	  “The	  Anatomy	  of	  a	  Third-­‐Party	  Enforcement	  Strategy”,	  (1986)	  2	  J.	  Law	  Econ.	  &	  Org.	  53.	  
8	  	   J.C.	  Coffee,	  Gatekeepers	  –	  The	  Professions	  and	  Corporate	  Governance,	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  U.P.,	  2006,	  at	  2.	  
9	  	   Ibid.,	  at	  7.	  
10	  	   Ibid.	  
11	  	   R.H.	  Kraakman,	  “Corporate	  Liability	  Strategies	  and	  the	  Costs	  of	  Legal	  Controls”,	  (1984)	  93	  Yale	  L.J.	  857,	  891.	  See	  
also	   H.E.	   Jackson,	   “Reflections	   on	   Kaye,	   Scholer:	   Enlisting	   Lawyers	   To	   Improve	   The	   Regulation	   of	   Financial	  
Institutions”,	   (1993)	   66	   S.	   Cal.	   L.	   Rev.	   1019;	   S.M.	   Beck,	   “Gatekeepers	   and	   the	   Commission:	   The	   Role	   of	  
Professionals	  in	  the	  Regulatory	  System”,	  in	  Securities	  Regulation:	  Issues	  and	  Perspectives,	  Scarborough,	  Carswell,	  
1993,	  at	  239.	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gatekeepers, in particular with the "noisy-withdrawal" and "up-the-ladder reporting" 
regime. Before discussing the reforms introduced by SOX, it is useful to examine to what 
extent corporate lawyers can indeed act as gatekeepers. 
As a starting point, it should be noted that not all lawyers are equally qualified to act 
as gatekeepers. In North America, the term lawyer refers to the legal professionals who 
are registered to practice law in any capacity.12 Amongst lawyers dealing with 
corporations, it is helpful to distinguish between those acting as litigators and those 
acting as counsel, and amongst the latter, in-house counsel as against external counsel. 
Litigators act as advocate for the corporation and will consider it their role to 
represent “zealously” the interests of their client, even to make the best case for conduct 
that looks reprehensible to other eyes.13 This does not bode well for the potential of 
litigators to act as gatekeepers in their dealings with the corporate client.14 
The role of corporate lawyers ("counsel") differs from that of the litigators. Corporate 
lawyers act as “transaction engineers” in planning, structuring, negotiating, drafting and 
implementing transactions for their clients.15 They are continuously involved in due 
diligence exercises in order to ensure the preparation of transactional and disclosure 
documents. Given the liability risk associated with these documents, corporate lawyers 
must have a critical perspective that forces them to eschew the role of “zealous 
advocates”. Corporate lawyers are repeat players involved ex ante in transactions 
“overseeing the ultimate passage of their clients' transactions from planning to fruition”.16 
All of this gives corporate lawyers access to information allowing them to detect and 
disrupt wrongful conduct and might qualify them as potential gatekeepers.17 
This gatekeeping function of corporate lawyers may be considered from the angle of 
in-house counsel as well as that of external counsel. According to Professor Gilson, in-
house general counsel is the best candidate for the gatekeeping function.18 In-house 
counsel is arguably well placed within the corporate structure to discharge this function, 
being involved with management in planning, strategy and decision-making process.19 
Their position provides in-house counsel with unique access to formal and informal 
information channels.   
External corporate lawyers can also act as gatekeepers. Coffee remarks that 
external counsel have traditionally considered themselves as “wise counselors”.20 As 
such, their role is to “gently guide their clients toward law compliance by pointing out the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  	   The	  distinction	  between	  barristers	  and	  solicitors	  does	  not	  exist	  in	  North	  America.	  	  
13	   J.C.	  Coffee,	  supra	  note	  8,	  at	  192.	  
14	  	   See	  however	  F.	  Zacharias,	  “Lawyers	  as	  Gatekeepers”,	  (2004)	  41	  San	  Diego	  L.	  Rev.	  1387.	  	  
15	  	   J.E.	  Fisch	  &	  K.M.	  Rosen,	  “Is	  There	  a	  Role	  for	  Lawyers	  in	  Preventing	  Future	  Enrons?”,	  (2003)	  48	  Vill.	  L.	  Rev.	  1097,	  
1130;	  R.	  Gilson,	  “Value	  Creation	  by	  Business	  Lawyers:	  Legal	  Skills	  and	  Asset	  Pricing”,	  (1984)	  94	  Yale	  L.	  J.	  239,	  at	  
290.	  	  
16	  	   R.	  Campbell	  &	  E.R.	  Gaetke,	  “The	  Ethical	  Obligations	  of	  Transactional	  Lawyers	  to	  Act	  as	  Gatekeepers”,	   (2003)	  56	  
Rutgers	  L.	  Rev.	  98.	  
17	  	   J.	  Loughrey,	  Corporate	  Lawyers	  and	  Corporate	  Governance,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  U.P.,	  2011,	  at	  77.	  
18	  	   R.J.	  Gilson,	  “The	  Devolution	  of	  the	  Legal	  Profession:	  A	  Demand	  Side	  Perspective”,	   (1990)	  49	  Md.	  L.	  Rev.	  869,	  at	  
915.	  
19	  	   S.H.	  Kim,	  “The	  Banality	  of	  Fraud:	  Re-­‐Situating	  the	  Inside	  Counsel	  as	  Gatekeeper”,	  (2005)	  74	  Fordham	  L.	  Rev.	  983.	  
20	  	   J.C.	  Coffee,	  Gatekeepers	  –	  The	  Professions	  and	  Corporate	  Governance,	  Oxford,	  Oxford	  U.P.,	  2006,	  at	  193.	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risks of alternative courses of actions”.21 The influence of external corporate lawyers 
rested in particular on the long-term relationship they built up with their clients. 
II. THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL FRAUDS: THE REGULATION OF 
CORPORATE LAWYERS’ GATEKEEPING FUNCTION 
In the wake of the financial scandals that led to the collapse of Enron and of other 
public corporations, a number of reports identified professional and ethical failings on the 
part of corporate lawyers and questioned their role as gatekeepers. The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act sought to address the failings of corporate lawyers and enhance the effectiveness of 
their gatekeeping function. While Canada was affected differently by corporate frauds, 
regulators nonetheless followed the U.S. initiatives and implemented reforms pursuing 
the same goals.  
A. An Overview of the Reform Initiatives Regulating Corporate Lawyers’ 
Gatekeeping Function 
Section 307 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act instructed the SEC (Securities and 
Exchange Commission) to enact rules setting “minimum standards of professional 
conduct” for attorneys “appearing or practicing before the Commission.” Such rules were 
required in particular to institute an up-the-ladder reporting system: lawyers were to be 
required to report “evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary 
duty or similar violation by the company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel 
or the chief executive officer of the company”. In addition, the rules should specify that in 
cases where the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond, lawyers must report 
to the audit committee of the board of directors or another committee comprised solely of 
external directors. As Fish and Rosen summarize, “Section 307 is designed to provide a 
type of early warning system for independent directors, who might otherwise, due to their 
limited involvement in day-to-day corporate operations, fail to identify potential 
problems”.22 
The SEC moved swiftly to adopt a rule that implemented these instructions. The 
American Bar Association, whilst opposed the enactment of Section 307, subsequently 
amended the Model Code of Professional Conduct to provide an exception to the 
ordinarily strict requirement of confidentiality in cases of financial fraud.23 Rule 1.6(b) 
was added to permit a lawyer to reveal information relating to the representation of a 
client to the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes: 1) to prevent the client from 
committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the 
financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used 
or is using the lawyer's services; 2) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the 
financial interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has 
resulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the 
client has used the lawyer's services. Further, ABA Model Rule 1.13 empowers a lawyer 
to disclose information relating to the representation where the highest authority in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  	   Ibid.	  
22	  	   J.E.	  Fisch	  &	  K.M.	  Rosen,	  “Is	  There	  a	  Role	  for	  Lawyers	  in	  Preventing	  Future	  Enrons?”,	  (2003)	  48	  Vill.	  L.	  Rev.	  1097,	  at	  
1112.	  
23	   Model	  Code	  of	  Professional	  Conduct,	  online:	  AMERICAN	  BAR	  ASSOCIATION	  	   	  
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_con
duct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_table_of_contents.html	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organization fails to address in a timely and appropriate manner an illegal act which the 
lawyer reasonably believes is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the 
organization. 
Following the U.S. initiatives, Canadian authorities undertook similar reforms. In 
2004, the Law Society of Upper Canada amended its Rules of Professional Conduct to 
introduce up-the-ladder reporting obligations in Ontario that are similar to the U.S. 
Rules.24 The Barreau du Québec modified its Code of ethics of advocates25 in 2004 to 
bring it into line with the U.S. reforms. The up-the-ladder reporting obligation is now 
generally recognized across Canada, being enacted in the Model Code of Professional 
Conduct of the Federation of Law Societies of Canada.26  
One significant difference with the U.S. regime should be noted. According to the 
Canadian rules of professional conduct, lawyers are not allowed to reveal privileged 
information to third parties under the guise of whistle-blowing. For instance, the Québec 
Code of ethics of advocates provides that a lawyer cannot report anything to an 
organization outside the client-corporation even where the latter fails to address the 
violation reported adequately. The only exception where a lawyer can communicate 
information protected by the duty of confidentiality is in order to prevent an act of 
violence. Otherwise, a lawyer needs to preserve the confidentiality of the client’s 
information, even in a financial fraud case.27  Hence, the only option for a lawyer where 
the highest authority fails to address financial fraud is to resign in accordance with the 
rules for withdrawal of representation and to cease representing the client-corporation.28 
B. A Critical Look at the Regulatory Initiatives 
While it has been recognized in case law from time to time,29 the role of corporate 
lawyers as gatekeepers remains a moot point in the literature. Critics argue that lawyers 
cannot be qualified as gatekeepers because this role runs counter to their classic role as 
advocates.30 As Zacharias argues, this critique blurs two different dimensions of the 
lawyer’s role. Lawyers do have the role to act on behalf of their clients to assist them 
pursuing lawful goals with lawful means. However, this is “quite different from saying that 
lawyers should do whatever clients want, assist clients in achieving illegal pursuits, or 
have no business shaping client ends”.31 Furthermore, this critique overlooks the status 
of lawyers as public officers of the justice system, which implies obligations to the public.  
It is important to draw a distinction between the functions of gatekeepers and of 
whistleblowers. Whistle-blowing “involves lawyers reporting confidential information 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  	   The	  Canadian	  Bar	  Association	  adopted	  changes	  to	  its	  Code	  of	  Professional	  Conduct	  in	  2004.	  
25	  	   Code	  of	  ethics	  of	  advocates,	  c.	  B-­‐1,	  r.	  3,	  s.	  3.00.01,	  3.05.18.	  
26	   Model	   Code	   of	   Professional	   Conduct,	   2012,	   s.	   2-­‐8,	   online:	   Federation	   of	   Law	   Societies	   of	   Canada:	  
http://www.flsc.ca/_documents/ModelcodeWTCrevdec2012FI.pdf	  	  
27	  	   FAQS	  about	   Privilege	  and	  Confidentiality	   for	   In-­‐House	  Counsel,	  November	   2012,	   at	   13-­‐15,	   online:	   Canadian	  Bar	  
Association:	  http://www.cba.org/cba/activities/pdf/CCCA-­‐FAQs.pdf	  	  
28	   Code	   of	   ethics	   of	   advocates,	   c.	   B-­‐1,	   r.	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  Fish,	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  The	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  of	  Lawyers	  and	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Corporate	  Governance	  Failures”,	  in	  P.	  Puri	  &	  J.	  Larson,	  Eds.,	  Corporate	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  Century,	  
Toronto,	  LexisNexis,	  2004,	  97,	  at	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pertaining to the client to outsiders, usually to protect third-party interests rather than the 
client’s”.32 Hence, whistleblowing raises conflicts with two basic principles that govern 
lawyers' practice: the duty to promote the client’s interests and the duty of confidentiality. 
Nonetheless, as we saw above, the ABA chose to assign such a whistle-blowing role to 
lawyers when it modified its professional rules of conduct following the Enron debacle. It 
is debatable whether this reform was sound policy given the extent to which it runs 
counter to lawyers’ traditional obligations.  
Another line of criticism questions the incentives facing corporate lawyers. With 
respect to in-house counsel, Professor Bainbridge aptly notes that even though in-house 
general counsel are formally appointed by the board, their tenure is generally 
determined by their relationship with the CEO.33  Moreover, the relationship with the 
CEO can also influence the compensation of general counsel, thereby increasing their 
dependence.34 Finally, in-house counsel are not really reputational intermediaries as 
they do not have reputational capital distinct from that of the corporation.35 
The trust that characterizes the relationship between lawyers and their clients may 
also affect the effectiveness of the reforms. Lawyers tend to identify with their client, 
creating a behavioural bias that limits their ability to consider management behaviour to 
be wrongful.36 Moreover, lawyers have a regular dialogue with management.37 Assigning 
to the lawyer the role of corporate gatekeeper might undermine the flow of information 
coming from management and reduce the quality of legal services that can be provided. 
In permitting the disclosure of confidential information in the case of corporate 
misconduct, lawyers may compromise their relationship with management, who might 
fear that information revealed would be used against them and abstain from revealing it. 
Yet “[t]he quality of the attorney’s counsel is a function of the quality of information he 
receives from the client … [t]he need for attorneys to act on an informed basis is at the 
heart of one of the bar’s most valued ethical principles – the attorney-client privilege”.38 
As regards external corporate lawyers, they are subject to pressures that can affect 
their effectiveness as gatekeepers.39 External counsel must maintain good relationships 
with the management and with in-house counsel who provide them with their business. 
The need to attract and retain clients may dampen their incentives to detect and disrupt 
misconduct. In addition, external counsel’s role as transaction engineers may limit their 
ability to provide a gatekeeping function, at least with respect to the transactions in 
which they have been involved. In such cases, they will not have the independence 
required to be reliable gatekeepers. Finally, the increasing reliance on in-house counsel 
has transformed the relationship of external lawyers with their clients. Increasingly, 
external lawyers are hired on a transaction-specific basis, thereby eroding their “wise 
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counsellor” role. A recent empirical study adds fuel to the doubts about external lawyers 
as gatekeepers.40 
Although these criticisms do not altogether disqualify corporate lawyers as 
gatekeepers, they do raise sensitive issues that must be taken into account in legal 
regimes aiming to give them a role in corporate governance.  
III. CONCLUSION 
Following the reforms introduced in North America in the last decade, lawyers have 
been formally integrated into the corporate governance regulatory framework. Canadian 
and U.S. regulation now clearly assigns a gatekeeping role to corporate lawyers. The 
legal qualification of corporate lawyers as gatekeepers has significant theoretical support 
in the literature. Yet criticism of this position raises doubts, or at least sensitive issues, 
regarding this qualification. We conclude that further empirical studies would be apposite 
to gain a finer grained understanding of the practice and contributions of corporate 
lawyers as gatekeepers and a better appreciation of the appropriateness of such role. 
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